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INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: Continuity and Change in the Present and Future Taxation of Cross-Border Intangible Income

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I. Introduction

Software engineers develop a patented computer operating system, and the company for which the engineers work generates high profits from selling and licensing the use of the operating system. n1 If the company is a U.S. company and the operating system is sold or licensed only in the United States, it might be easy enough to conclude that all the patent-related sales income should be taxed exclusively in the United States. If, instead, the operating system is developed entirely in the United States but is sold both in the United States and abroad, should the U.S. income measurement question be viewed differently?

Now consider a more complicated - and also more realistic - scenario. The U.S. company has foreign subsidiaries organized in, among other locations, Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore. n2 These subsidiaries pay a portion of the global company's expenditures on research and development related to the operating system. Employees of the [*508] Irish, Puerto Rican, and Singaporean subsidiaries perform various functions. For example, employees of one or more foreign subsidiaries contribute to the development of new versions of the operating system, including tailoring those versions for use in the regions in which the employees perform their work. Employees of the foreign affiliates also are engaged in the production of physical copies of the software. An Irish subsidiary is responsible for selling the operating system (or licensing its use) to customers in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. A Puerto Rican subsidiary has similar responsibilities for customers in North America and South America, and a Singaporean subsidiary performs sales and licensing functions for Asian customers. The Irish, Puerto Rican, and Singaporean subsidiaries carry out their sales and licensing functions by contracting with local distributors in the respective regions. Some local distributors are affiliated with, and other local distributors are unaffiliated with, the U.S.-headed company.

Under these more complicated facts, the United States understandably might assert jurisdiction to tax some portion of the foreign sales income attributable to the operating system patents because, among other reasons, U.S. research created the patents and is responsible for a significant portion of changes to the operating system when the company releases new versions of the software. But would it be reasonable for the United States to argue that it should have primary taxing rights over all income attributable to older and newer patents even though some activities - manufacturing, product tailoring, and sales efforts - take place outside the United States? If some, but not all, the patent-related income belongs within the U.S. taxing jurisdiction, how much? Should the answer to this question vary based on the rates of taxation imposed by Ireland, Puerto Rico, and Singapore?

Commentators have detailed the ways in which the United States does - and does not - tax cross-border income from patents and other intangible property developed partly or entirely in the United States. For the most part these commentators have illustrated, through data and through concrete examples involving primarily pharmaceutical and technology companies, that under the current rules U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) often are able to pay little U.S. or foreign tax on this cross-border intangible income. n3 Some commentators have [*509] offered reform proposals aimed at increasing the U.S. tax burden on this income, largely through changes to the transfer pricing rules. n4

Through hearings and legislation, members of the U.S. Congress also have expressed views about the U.S. taxation of cross-border intangible income. Some members of Congress have argued that U.S. MNCs should pay more tax on their cross-border intangible income, but members also have been concerned about the competitiveness of U.S. MNCs in relation to foreign MNCs. n5

This Article offers a descriptive and thematic approach to understanding some of the special rules that Congress has written - and that it might write in the future - concerning the taxation of cross-border intangible income. Before providing a thematic overview of current rules and glimpsing into the future, Part II first defines intangible income and then provides data that shows why the taxation of cross-border intangible income matters. Part III describes several special Code provisions addressed to the taxation of cross-border intangible income and argues that these special rules reflect Congress' attempt over time to balance two competing policies: (1) stopping the tax-favored shifting of intangible property and income out of the United States and (2) avoiding more burdensome U.S. taxation of U.S. MNCs' cross-border intangible income than the taxation imposed by other countries on similar income derived by foreign MNCs. These two policies are versions of the two competing norms, capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality, which have dominated the five-decades-old narrative about U.S. international tax policy generally. Part IV surveys four recent proposals related to the taxation of intangible income and argues that these proposals are based on the same two policies that explain the special current law rules described in Part III. Part IV also identifies a third policy objective of several of the recent proposals - encouraging U.S. research - and illustrates that this policy, like the two themes identified in Part III, is not new. In Part V I argue that although these recent proposals do not represent a [*510] fundamental rethinking of how the United States should tax U.S. MNCs' cross-border intangible income, the proposals include at least two elements - destination-based rules and formula-based rules - that represent significant departures from current international tax rules. These destination-and formula-based rules join a growing global challenge to the role of two central features of the current international tax structure, source-based taxation and arm's-length transfer pricing rules. Policymakers and MNCs around the world sense - and to varying degrees are contributing to - great instability in the international tax regime.

II. The Meaning and Importance of Intangible Property

A. What Is Intangible Property?

Because the meaning of intangible property may not be self-evident, discussion of the taxation of cross-border income from intangible property must start with a definition. If in concept the corporate income tax captures all returns to a corporation's equity capital, one might think of the taxation of an MNC's income from intangible property as applying to all the returns to the MNC that are not attributable to the corporation's equity capital that is invested in tangible assets. n6 For example, if a company had a single tangible asset, a factory for building cars, and it was known that the factory generated a 12% return on the investment in the factory, but the company's return on all equity capital was 20%, the 8% return not attributable to the investment in the factory would be income from intangible property. In this example, the intangible property might include a secret manufacturing process, patents on technology used in car components, and the company's brand name.

When the Code defines intangible property, it does not do so by resort to this residual concept, but instead by referring to specific items of property. Two important cross-border tax rules related to intangible property income, the special rules for transfers of intangible property by domestic corporations to foreign corporations and the special transfer pricing rule for transfers or licenses of intangible property, define intangible property broadly as "any - (i) patent, invention, formula, process, design, pattern, or know-how; (ii) copyright, literary, musical, or artistic composition; (iii) trademark, trade name, or brand name; (iv) franchise, license, or contract; (v) method, program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast, estimate, [*511] customer list, or technical data; or (vi) any similar item, which has substantial value independent of the services of any individual." n7

Pfizer's income attributable to its patents on its cholesterol-reducing drug Lipitor was intangible property income. Google's income attributable to its proprietary search software is intangible property income. Coca Cola's income attributable to its secret formula for the eponymous soda is intangible property income. Procter & Gamble's income from laundry detergent sales related to the brand name Tide is intangible property income. This recitation of examples of intangible property income may seem straightforward, but it also should prompt one question that (along with others) makes the taxation of intangible property income anything but straightforward: When a company has revenues from, for example, product sales, how might a taxpayer or the IRS decide the amount of income that is attributable to intangible property rather than to, for instance, the machines that make the company's products? Special rules for intangible income, broadly defined, may necessitate such a determination.

B. Why Does the Taxation of Intangible Property Income Matter?

Decisions about how to tax intangible income are important because under various measures intangible property contributes significantly to economic growth and to the revenues of U.S. MNCs. Reliable estimates of aggregate values of intangible property owned by U.S. MNCs or in the U.S. economy as a whole are scarce, but three broad measures - business spending on intangible property, spending on research and development, and U.S. MNCs' revenues from royalties - confirm the economic importance of intangibles.

Businesses spend large sums on intangible property, both in absolute terms and relative to the overall economy. One study has found that U.S. businesses spent in the aggregate about $ 1.2 trillion annually [*512] on intangible property from 1998 through 2000, approximately 13% of gross domestic product (GDP) in those years. n8 The authors of the study concluded that most, but not all (about $ 1 trillion of this $ 1.2 trillion of this expenditure or about 10 to 11% of GDP) should be considered investment in long-lasting capital that increased the economy's productive capacity. n9 This amount of business investment in intangibles was about the same as the amount of business investment in tangible property in the same years. n10

Studies of research and development spending similarly confirm the centrality of intangible property. Research and development creates intangible property when, for example, it leads to discoveries that are patented. Although patents and other intangible property that result from research and development increase the economy's productive capacity, official GDP measures by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) treat spending on research and development as an expense rather than as investment that has long-lasting effects on the economy. n11 Recognizing that its official measures fail to capture the economic effects of research and development, the BEA has created what it calls a "Research and Development Satellite Account" that is a source of statistics for inquiry into the economic consequences of research and development. n12 Among other things, the satellite account provides estimates of the effects on GDP of treating research and development as investment rather than [*513] as an expense. n13 In its most recent estimate, the BEA has concluded that GDP in inflation-adjusted terms would have been 2.6% higher annually, on average, from 2002 through 2007 had research and development been treated as investment rather than as spending. n14

For-profit businesses, nonprofit organizations, and the government engage in research and development activities. It is research and development undertaken by for-profit businesses that is the most relevant with respect to the taxation of cross-border intangible property income. Under the convention that treats research and development as investment rather than as an expense, business (as opposed to nonprofit or government) research and development contributed .20 percentage points to the 2.2 percentage point increase in inflation-adjusted GDP from 2006 to 2007; government and nonprofit research in combination contributed .08 percentage points to this GDP growth. n15 As one more illustration of the economic effects of research and development, if research and development spending had been treated as investment, private fixed investment in 2007 would have been, in inflation-adjusted terms, $ 256.4 billion, or 11.3% higher than the official measure of private fixed investment in that year. n16

Research and development is important not only in the economy as a whole. It is also a significant component of the value added by U.S. MNCs. n17 If a U.S. MNC's research and development expenditures are treated as investment, these expenditures no longer reduce the MNC's profits, and the firm's value added, of which one component is profits, increases correspondingly. In 2008, the value added of parent companies of U.S. MNCs would have increased by $ 182.5 billion, or 7.2%, if research and development had been treated as investment. n18 The 2008 figures for majority-owned foreign affiliates of U.S. MNCs are $ 35.4 billion and 2.8%. n19

Intangible property is important to U.S. MNCs under a third measure, the volume of royalties and license fees paid between U.S. MNCs' parent corporations and their foreign affiliates. Royalties and license fees are amounts paid for the use of intangible property such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights. In 2011 U.S. parent corporations received $ 73.1 billion (in nominal dollars) in royalties and license [*514] fees from their foreign affiliates and paid $ 7 billion of royalties and license fees to these affiliates, for total net receipts of $ 66.1 billion. n20 By comparison, in the same year U.S. parent corporations had an aggregate total return of $ 457.6 billion attributable to their equity ownership of, and loans to, their foreign affiliates. n21 Accordingly, for every $ 7 that U.S. parent corporations earned in relation to their debt and equity investments in foreign affiliates, they received $ 1 in net receipts from those affiliates in royalties and license fees. n22

III. Special Intangibles Rules with Competing Policy Goals

A. Special Code Rules

Given the importance of intangible property to U.S. MNCs and in the economy as a whole, the rules for the taxation of cross-border intangible income might at first seem sparse. In part, this seeming sparseness of intangibles-specific rules in the Code masks the great complexity of those rules as interpreted by the IRS and Treasury. The sparseness, however, also reflects that, in contrast with some other countries, the United States does not have a schedular income tax system under which different categories of income are subject to separate income tax rules. n23 Instead, as will no doubt be familiar, "gross income," which is the base of the income tax, "means all income from whatever source derived." n24 Consequently, the Code does not include a discrete set of rules for the taxation of intangible income.

Instead, as it occasionally has done for other categories of income, Congress has at different times addressed various policy aims by adding to provisions of more general application rules related specifically [*515] to the taxation of cross-border intangible income. n25 These intangibles-related tax rules in the Code, and the transfer pricing rules applicable to related-party transfers of intangible property (provided by Treasury regulations), have been described at great length elsewhere. n26 Consequently, rather than provide pages of detail about the various special rules for taxing cross-border intangible income, this Article gives a brief, thematic description of certain prominent special Code rules and argues that these rules reflect Congress' attempt over time to achieve competing policy goals.

The special tax rules related to cross-border intangible income can be described in terms of two themes: jurisdictional rules that have the effect of ceding to other countries the primary right to tax much foreign intangible income of U.S. MNCs, and substance-over-form rules that circumscribe the principle of respect for the separateness of related legal entities when a U.S. person transfers intangible property to a foreign affiliate.

1. Jurisdictional Rules

The jurisdictional rules that cede to other countries the primary right to tax much foreign intangible income of U.S. MNCs comprise rules for determining the source, U.S. or foreign, of certain income, and rules for whether the United States taxes currently certain income under subpart F. The source and subpart F rules most directly related to intangibles income are the rules for royalties. n27 Royalties, after all, are payments received for, among other things, a license to use intangible [*516] property, and, as noted previously, U.S. MNCs receive tens of billions of dollars annually in royalty payments.

A royalty received for the use of intangible property such as a patent, copyright, or trademark is foreign-source income if the property is used outside the United States. n28 Under this rule, if a U.S. parent company licenses intangible property to, for example, a foreign affiliate or an unrelated foreign company, and the affiliate or unrelated company uses the property in its business outside the United States, the U.S. parent company's royalty income from the license is foreign source. Similarly, if, rather than licensing intangible property, a U.S. parent company sells intangible property in exchange for payments that are contingent on, for instance, sales attributable to the intangible property, the payments for the sale of the intangible property are treated as royalty payments and, therefore, are foreign-source if the property is used outside the United States. n29

Foreign-source treatment of a U.S. parent company's royalties matters not because it means that the United States excludes the royalties from taxation - it does not - but rather because foreign-source treatment helps the corporation in its foreign tax credit (FTC) planning. In particular, the amount of a company's FTC is limited, in general terms, to the amount of U.S. tax imposed (before the credit) on the company's foreign-source income. n30 Foreign-source royalties received by U.S. companies are often subject to little or no foreign tax, but because they are foreign source, they increase the amount of a company's allowable FTC. n31 Consequently, companies may, and do, use

FTCs generated by other, highly taxed foreign income (excess credits) to offset residual U.S. tax on foreign royalties. n32 Prominent economists have estimated that in 2000 approximately two-thirds of royalties [*517] received by U.S. MNCs were sheltered from U.S. tax by these excess credits. n33 In practice, therefore, the U.S. parent company of a U.S. MNC that owns valuable intellectual property in the form of, for example, patents or secret formulas or processes can derive intangible income from licensing this property to foreign affiliates or unrelated third parties and pay less than full U.S. tax on the income. n34

Special subpart F rules exempt from current U.S. taxation some royalty payments that otherwise would face current U.S. taxation under the general rules of subpart F. When a U.S. person owns 10% or more of the stock of a foreign corporation, and five or fewer U.S. people own in the aggregate more than 50% of the stock of that corporation (a CFC), subpart F taxes each 10% U.S. shareholder of the CFC on a current basis on its share of certain items of the CFC's income (the CFC's subpart F income) even if the CFC does not distribute earnings to its shareholders. n35 Subpart F generally is intended to prevent U.S. persons engaged in foreign business operations from avoiding U.S. tax on passive investment income or on certain sales or services income that can easily be shifted from one country (such as the United States) to another country (such as a low-tax foreign jurisdiction). n36 One category of subpart F income, foreign personal holding company income, includes passive investment income such as [*518] dividends, interest, rents, and royalties. n37 Consequently, in the absence of special rules to the contrary, if a CFC wholly owned by a U.S. corporation licensed intangible property to an affiliate or unrelated party and in exchange received royalties, the United States would tax the U.S. parent corporation on the royalties at the time they were received. The United States would thereby collect tax on intangible income of CFCs to the extent that income consisted of royalties.

Two exceptions, however, relieve this taxation. The so-called active royalties exception exempts from foreign personal holding company income royalties that are received in the active conduct of a trade or business from unrelated persons. n38 And the CFC look-through rule excludes from foreign personal holding company income dividends, interest, rents, and royalties received by one CFC from another CFC to the extent that, among other requirements, the payments are not attributable to subpart F income of the paying CFC. n39 As a result of these exceptions from subpart F, to the extent the intangible income of U.S. MNCs consists of royalties derived by CFCs from licensing intangible property as part of their business operations, the U.S. MNCs avoid current U.S. taxation of this intangible income without resort to sophisticated planning. n40

[*519]

2. Substance-over-Form Rules

Two rules that apply to transfers of intangible property by a U.S. person to a foreign affiliate elevate the substance of the transfer over its form and thereby circumscribe the more general respect for the separateness of related legal entities. The two rules are the commensurate-with-income requirement for related-party transfers of intangible property under the transfer pricing rules of § 482 and the similar § 367(d) commensurate-with-income requirement for transfers of intangible property by domestic corporations to foreign corporations. The principle of respect for legal form is central to the more general rules in which the special commensurate-with-income rules are found. Section 482 gives the Treasury Secretary nearly unparalleled authority to allocate income between related taxpayers. The only direction is that the income allocation must be necessary to prevent tax evasion or to clearly reflect the income of any one of the taxpayers. Given such a broad grant of regulatory authority, one could imagine a scenario in which the IRS and Treasury had written regulations that treated a commonly controlled group of taxpayers as a single entity and apportioned the group's income across jurisdictions based on objective (or, depending on one's perspective, arbitrary) criteria such as the location of sales, tangible capital, or labor. n41 In reality, however, the IRS and Treasury have interpreted their authority by promulgating regulations that implement the arm's-length standard - the standard "of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled entity." n42 This arm's-length standard presupposes that related parties are separate from one another and that the government should adjust transactions [*520] between parties only to align the transactions with the same or similar transactions between wholly independent parties.

Section 367 similarly presupposes as a general matter that when a domestic corporation transfers property to a foreign corporation, the two entities are separate from one another - even if, among other possibilities, the domestic corporation controls the foreign corporation after the transfer. Section 367 applies in situations in which the tax rules otherwise would permit the transferor corporation to recognize no gain (and would bar recognition of any loss) on its transfer to the foreign corporation because, among other possibilities, the transaction satisfied the requirements of a stock-for-stock reorganization that qualifies for nonrecognition treatment under § 354. Nothing about the tax-free reorganization rules disregards the separateness of the transferor and transferee corporations. The rules merely alter whether an exchange between the parties is taxable immediately. Similarly, nothing about § 367, which turns off the normal rule of nontaxability in various cross-border transactions, dictates that a transfer from one corporation to another is not a transfer between two separate entities. To the contrary, § 367 reinstates all the normal tax consequences in such a transfer, thereby confirming the separateness of the two entities.

Congress enacted the commensurate-with-income rules of § 482 and § 367(d) based on the conflicting principle of substance over form. Both rules require that, when one taxpayer transfers or licenses intangible property to another taxpayer, the income in respect of that transfer must be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible. The § 482 commensurate-with-income requirement applies to actual sales or licenses of intangible property from one related taxpayer to another. The § 367(d) commensurate-with-income requirement applies when a domestic corporation transfers intangible property to a foreign corporation not in a sale or a license, but instead (as one common example) in an exchange in which the domestic transferor corporation receives stock of the foreign transferee corporation and controls that foreign corporation immediately after the exchange. When they apply, the commensurate-with-income rules permit the government to adjust the income stream of the domestic transferor corporation to reflect the income stream of the transferred intangible. This adjustment may take the form of imputed royalty payments. Imputed royalty payments respect the transaction as formally occurring between two separate taxpayers, thus conforming to the principle of respect for legal separateness. In substance, however, the result is comparable to the transferor's not having made the transfer and instead having received income from the intangible property [*521] directly. This result elevates substance - here, the proposition that the transferor of the intangible should include in income an appropriate return on the intangible - over the form of the transaction, which is that the price of the transfer was negotiated by separate legal entities and should be respected.

B. Competing Policy Goals

Congress has enacted a variety of special rules for cross-border intangible income because it has tried over time to balance competing policy goals. With some rules, Congress has sought to stop tax-favored migration of U.S. MNCs' intangible property and income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions. In other rules, Congress has tried to avoid imposing on U.S. MNCs' cross-border intangible income more burdensome taxation than the taxation that other countries impose on similar income derived by U.S. MNCs' foreign competitors.

Congress has attempted to stop the tax-favored migration of intangible property and income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions by taxing 10% U.S. shareholders on their shares of CFC royalty income and by enacting the commensurate-with-income rules of§§367(d) and 482. According to the legislative history accompanying the House version of the Revenue Act of 1962, the Ways and Means Committee chose to include in its subpart F rules a provision that taxed 10% U.S. shareholders currently on their undistributed shares of CFC income from, among other things, the license or sale of patents and copyrights substantially developed in the United States "on the grounds that where a patent, copyright, etc., was developed or created in the United States, it is likely that, if it were not for lower taxes abroad, the rights to it would still be held by the domestic company with this company merely licensing its use by the foreign corporation." n43 In other words, in the absence of a rule imposing current taxation of intangible income derived by CFCs, U.S. MNCs would have an incentive to transfer patents and other intangible property to CFCs that could derive lightly taxed foreign income from the property.

The legislative history to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 includes a similar rationale for the commensurate-with-income rules of § 367(d) and § 482. The Ways and Means Committee report accompanying the House version of the 1986 law, which included the commensurate- [*522] with-income rules in almost the identical form in which they were ultimately enacted into law, described the reason for those rules as follows:

There is a strong incentive for taxpayers to transfer intangibles to related foreign corporations or possessions corporations in a low tax jurisdiction, particularly when the intangible has a high value relative to manufacturing or assembly costs. Such transfers can result in indefinite tax deferral or effective tax exemption on the earnings, while retaining the value of the earnings in the related group. n44

The committee expressed concern that the transfer pricing and outbound transfer rules of § 482 and § 367 were not preserving U.S. taxation of an adequate amount of income when a U.S. person transferred intangible property to a related foreign person. n45 It concluded that, by contrast with the outcomes when related-party transfers of intangibles were judged by reference to unrelated-party transfers, a rule taxing the U.S. transferor on an amount commensurate with the income attributable to the transferred intangible property would guarantee an appropriate level of U.S. taxation in relation to that property. n46

The 1962 change related to CFC royalty income and the 1986 enactment of the commensurate-with-income rules thus exhibit congressional concern that the then-current rules gave taxpayers an incentive to transfer intangible property and, with it, the income from that property to affiliates in low-tax countries. Congress has sought to balance that concern with the conflicting objective of not disadvantaging U.S. MNCs in relation to their foreign peer firms by taxing the U.S. MNCs' foreign intangible income in a more burdensome manner than the taxation imposed on similar income derived by foreign firms. This latter objective explains the active royalties exception and the more recent CFC look-through rule. As noted previously, the House version of the Revenue Act of 1962 included a broader provision than was ultimately enacted into law for taxing a U.S. shareholder currently on a CFC's income from patents, copyrights, and other intangible property. n47 The Senate version of the bill that became law provided the active royalties exception of current law, the rule under which royalties (and rents) are not foreign personal holding company income if they are received in the active conduct of a business from unrelated [*523] parties. n48 A single sentence in the Senate Finance Committee report accompanying the Senate bill describes the reason for this exception while also justifying the general imposition of current taxation of undistributed passive investment income of CFCs: "Your committee, while recognizing the need to maintain active American business operations abroad on an equal competitive footing with other operating businesses in the same countries, nevertheless sees no need to maintain the deferral of U.S. tax where the investments are portfolio types of investments ... ." n49 In the context of the enactment of subpart F, keeping a U.S. MNC's foreign business operations on "an equal competitive footing" with non-U.S. firms' operations in the same countries meant, among other things, not taxing what normally would be considered portfolio income if that income was derived from unrelated third parties as part of the U.S. MNC's business.

The Ways and Means Committee had the same rationale for including the temporary CFC look-through rule in 2005 tax legislation. n50 The CFC look-through rule can be seen as an expansion of the active royalties (and rents) exception because it applies to dividends and interest as well as to royalties and rents and because it is available for payments from related CFCs as opposed to from unrelated taxpayers. The committee report describes the reason for the look-through rule in competitiveness terms: "Most countries allow their companies to redeploy active foreign earnings with no additional tax burden. The Committee believes that this provision will make U.S. companies and U.S. workers more competitive with respect to such countries." n51 In other words, the U.S. rules burdened U.S. MNCs more heavily than the tax laws of foreign countries burdened foreign MNCs when an entity in the MNC group used business earnings to make a cross-border royalty or other payment to another entity in the group. The Ways and Means Committee wanted to end what it viewed as a competitive disadvantage.

Readers familiar with debates over international tax policy will have noticed that the competing policy goals underlying the various rules for cross-border intangible income are the same as the competing theoretical justifications for the broader scheme of international taxation. Participants in the debate about the proper theoretical basis for the U.S. international tax regime have argued over different neutralities. n52 [*524] Congress' attempt to prevent the tax-favored migration of intangible property and income can be understood as part of a larger view that the U.S. tax rules should not create a preference for foreign investment over domestic investment. In the international tax jargon this view has been termed capital export neutrality. n53 Congress' objective of not subjecting U.S. MNCs to more burdensome taxation of their cross-border intangible income than the taxation faced by foreign MNCs operating in the same jurisdictions can be understood as part of a broader view that the U.S. tax rules should aim for equal taxation of a U.S. firm and a foreign firm that are operating in the same (third) country. n54 The international tax lingo has given this perspective the name capital import neutrality. n55 Arguments over the taxation of cross-border intangible income have persisted alongside the more general debate about the U.S. scheme for taxing cross-border income for many decades. The discussion has been particularly active in the last several years, and policymakers have proposed changing the ways in which the United States taxes cross-border intangible income, a topic to which this Article now turns.

IV. New Proposals, Old Goals

As described near the beginning of this Article, stories in the popular press and articles in tax practice publications and academic journals have revealed discontent with the U.S. taxation of cross-border intangible income. n56 The discontent has centered on the argument that the current rules inappropriately permit U.S. MNCs to escape U.S. taxation of income attributable to intangible property developed in or otherwise connected to the United States. At the same time, some policymakers and U.S. MNCs have argued that the U.S. international tax rules as a whole disadvantage U.S. MNCs relative to their [*525] foreign competitors. n57 Policymakers have released comprehensive international tax reform proposals and proposals that more specifically address cross-border intangible income (in two cases, within comprehensive reform proposals). This Part situates four recent, specifically intangibles-directed proposals in the context of the competing policy goals of stopping tax-favored intangible property migration and of avoiding U.S. taxation of U.S. MNCs' cross-border intangible income that is more burdensome than foreign taxation of foreign MNCs' intangible income. It also introduces a third policy goal - encouraging U.S. research activities - that partly or entirely explains several of the recent proposals and that also is the basis of the research and experimentation tax credit.

The discussion includes four proposals: (1) President Obama's budget proposal to tax so-called "excess returns" associated with transfers of intangible property from the United States to low-tax foreign countries (the "excess returns proposal"); n58 (2) Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp's proposal, included as part of his discussion draft of a bill to adopt a dividend exemption system for taxing foreign business income of CFCs, to subject CFCs' intangible income to current U.S. taxation and to tax U.S. parent companies' and CFCs' foreign intangible income at a reduced rate (commonly, and in this Article, referred to as "Option C"); n59 (3) Senator Michael Enzi's proposal, likewise included in a larger international tax reform bill, to [*526] subject CFCs' low-tax foreign income, including intangible income, to current U.S. taxation and to tax U.S. parent companies at a reduced rate on their foreign intangible income attributable to U.S. business operations; n60 and (4) a proposal by Rep. Allyson Schwartz to tax certain patent-related income at a 10% rate. n61

A. Anti-Migration

One of the two policy goals described previously, stopping the tax-favored migration of intangible property and income overseas, explains the excess returns proposal and elements of Chairman Camp's Option C and the Enzi proposal. The excess returns proposal would tax currently under subpart F all or a portion of the income from transactions connected with or benefitting from intangible property transferred by a U.S. person to a related CFC if the income was subject to an effective foreign tax rate of less than 15% and to the extent the income exceeded costs related to the income plus a percentage markup. n62 Intangible property transfers that would trigger application of the proposal include sales, leases, licenses, and shared risk or development [*527] agreements (including cost-sharing arrangements). n63 The "Reasons for Change" section of the proposal includes the following statement about the rationale for the proposal:

There is evidence indicating that income shifting through transfers of intangibles to low-taxed affiliates has resulted in a significant erosion of the U.S. tax base. Expanding subpart F to include excess income from intangibles transferred to low-taxed affiliates will reduce the incentive for taxpayers to engage in these transactions. n64

Elements of Camp's Option C and the Enzi proposal are similarly aimed at reducing U.S. MNCs' U.S. tax incentive to transfer intangible property to low-taxed foreign affiliates. Option C does a couple things, one of which is taxpayer favorable and is described later. n65 The anti-intangible-shifting element of Option C would provide current U.S. taxation under subpart F of a CFC's intangible income if the income was subject to an effective foreign tax rate of not more than 60% of the maximum U.S. corporate tax rate. n66 To the extent the intangible income was foreign intangible income, meaning that it was derived in connection with servicing a foreign market, current U.S. taxation under subpart F would be at a reduced, 15% rate. n67 Intangible income derived in connection with serving the U.S. market would [*528] taxed at the Discussion Draft's regular 25% corporate tax rate. n68 The anti-shifting element of the Enzi proposal creates a new category of subpart F income, "low-taxed income," for income of a CFC that was subject to an effective foreign tax rate of not more than half the U.S. corporate tax rate (which would remain unchanged at 35% under Senator Enzi's bill). n69 The Enzi proposal excludes from this new subpart F category income that satisfies certain requirements for being considered "qualified business income." n70 In no event, however, would intangible income be qualified business income. n71 Accordingly, the Enzi proposal would treat a CFC's intangible income that was subject to a foreign tax rate of 17.5% or less as low-taxed income subject to current U.S. taxation in all circumstances.

Senator Enzi's statements related to his bill make no specific mention of the bill's special rule for intangible income, but Chairman Camp's statements with respect to his Option C might also explain the Enzi proposal. A one-page summary of the Camp Discussion Draft states that the draft "includes a number of anti-abuse rules to prevent erosion of the U.S. tax base and help make the participation exemption system a revenue neutral component of tax reform, such as: ... income shifting rules that prevent U.S. companies from avoiding U.S. tax by transferring highly valuable intangible property to foreign companies that pay little or no tax." n72 This statement expresses a policy concern strikingly similar to the concern expressed in the legislative history of the 1986 commensurate-with-income rules that taxpayers had "a strong incentive ... to transfer intangibles to related foreign corporations ... in a low tax jurisdiction." n73 That statement, in turn, differs little from the view expressed in the 1962 subpart F legislative history that when a patent is developed in the United States [*529] it would likely remain in the United States, with rights to its use abroad granted to foreign related parties by license "if it were not for lower taxes abroad." n74 The concern about income-shifting through migration of intangible property abroad has remained remarkably consistent over fifty years.

B. Avoiding Relative Burdens

The second of the two previously mentioned policy goals, the concern to avoid taxation of U.S. MNCs' intangible income at a level that would unduly burden U.S. MNCs relative to their foreign competitors, partly explains other elements of Option C and the Enzi proposal. As described previously, Option C would tax CFCs' foreign intangible income - that is, intangible income derived in connection with (1) property that is sold for use, consumption, or disposition outside the United States or (2) services provided with respect to persons or property located outside the United States - at a significantly reduced (15%) rate. n75 Option C also provides that if a U.S. parent company derived foreign intangible income directly, rather than through a CFC, the U.S. parent company would be taxed on the income at the same reduced rate. n76 The Enzi proposal includes a similar feature: It would tax a U.S. parent corporation's "qualified foreign intangible income" - foreign intangible income, defined similarly to the Option C definition, derived by the U.S. corporation in the active conduct of a trade or business in the United States - at half the normal corporate tax rate. n77

The Discussion Draft Summary describes the coupling of a reduced tax rate on foreign intangible income with a new category of subpart F income for all intangible income of CFCs as a carrot-and-stick approach to taxing intangible income. n78 The Enzi proposal's coupling of its new low-taxed subpart F category with the halving of the corporate tax rate on foreign intangible income of U.S. corporations likewise can be thought of as a carrot-and-stick approach. In both cases, the carrot is a reduction in the U.S. tax burden on cross-border intangible income motivated by the broad concern that the current U.S. tax rules impose excessive taxation on the foreign income [*530] of U.S. MNCs relative to the home-country tax burdens faced by foreign MNCs.

This broad concern underlies the larger international tax reform bills that include Option C and the Enzi proposal. Both the Camp Discussion Draft and Senator Enzi's legislation would move the United States to territorial-style, or dividend exemption, regimes of international taxation under which foreign business income derived by CFCs would be largely exempt from U.S. taxation when repatriated to U.S. parent companies through dividends. n79 A background document released with the Camp Discussion Draft justifies the shift to a dividend exemption system as a way of equalizing the tax treatment of U.S. and foreign firms when those firms operate across borders:

A key component of the House Republican tax reform plan is shifting from a "worldwide" system of taxation - which double taxes American companies when they attempt to compete with foreign companies in overseas markets - to a more competitive, pro-job creation "territorial" tax system that puts our companies on a level playing field with foreign competitors. n80

Senator Enzi also has argued for his legislation based on competitiveness:

Enacted in the 1960s, our current international tax rules have passed their expiration date. Many of the U.S. major trading partners, including Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and most of Europe have moved to what are called territorial tax systems... . The bill I am introducing would help to right the ship by pulling our international tax rules into the 21st century so U.S. companies are not at a competitive disadvantage with foreign companies because of American tax rules that are outdated by changes most other countries have already made. n81

[*531] A specific concern of the taxpayer-favorable elements of Option C and the Enzi proposal - to avoid overly burdensome taxation of U.S. MNCs' intangible income by comparison with the taxation imposed by foreign countries on foreign MNCs - therefore can be understood as part of the broader policy of the bills in which the intangibles rules are included. Chairman Camp and Senator Enzi have articulated this broader policy in the language of capital import neutrality that has featured prominently in the international tax debates of the last five decades.

C. Encouraging U.S. Research

The taxpayer-favorable elements of Option C and the Enzi proposal are also motivated by yet another policy: The tax rules should encourage U.S.-based research activities. Like the two dueling policies already discussed, incentives for U.S. research have long-established precedents in the tax law. The Discussion Draft Summary refers to the reduced rate of tax on foreign intangible income derived by CFCs and U.S. parent companies as an "innovation box." n82 In introducing his legislation, Senator Enzi said, "This bill would reduce the U.S. tax burden on income generated by American companies from ideas and inventions. This bill would encourage companies to develop and keep rights to ideas and inventions in the United States." n83

Representative Schwartz shares the view that the tax rules should encourage the development of "ideas and inventions" in the United States. The Schwartz patent box would tax at a 10% rate a taxpayer's high returns from, among other things, selling, leasing, or licensing in its trade or business properties in which patents are used. n84 The amount of a taxpayer's income qualifying for the 10% rate would increase as the taxpayer's research expenses increased as a proportion [*532] of its overall costs. n85 According to Representative Schwartz's press release accompanying introduction of the original version of her bill, one reason why Congress should pass the bill is "to promote research and development by incentivizing companies to hire American scientists and researchers." n86

The policy goal of encouraging U.S. research owes in part to anxiety that the United States is losing its global position as a source of research and innovation. n87 Like the dueling policy goals of the excess returns proposal, Option C, and the Enzi proposal, anxiety over America's position in the world and a desire to use the Code to prevent a perceived slide is not new. When Congress passed the original version of the research and experimentation tax credit in 1981, it was motivated by similar concerns. n88 The research credit is a tax credit for [*533] wages, supplies, contract research expenditures, and certain other amounts paid in connection with a trade or business for qualified research undertaken in the United States or any U.S. territory such as Puerto Rico. n89 The credit is generally equal to 20% of the amount of qualified research expenses to the extent that amount exceeds a base period amount. n90 The Ways and Means Committee report accompanying the original version of the credit in 1981 provided the following rationale for the credit:

The committee believes that a substantial tax credit for incremental research and experimental expenditures will overcome the resistance of many businesses to bear the significant costs ... which must be incurred in initiating or expanding research programs... . Aggregate research and development spending in this country has experienced a ... period of decline. In 1967, total expenditures reached a high of 2.91 percent of GNP before declining over ten years to 2.26 percent in 1977, and then increasing to an estimated 2.30 percent in 1980. If military and space research expenditures are subtracted from the total, the "civilian" research/GNP ratio for the United States is 1.5 percent, compared with 1.9 percent for Japan and 2.3 percent for West Germany. The committee believes that the decline in this country's research and development activities has adversely affected economic growth, productivity gains, and our competitiveness in world markets. n91

In putting forward their various proposals, Chairman Camp, Senator Enzi, and Representative Schwartz have repeated the sentiments expressed thirty years ago that America is losing its lead in research and innovation, that the Code can be used to arrest this perceived slipping, and that increased research will spur job creation and economic growth.

[*534]

V. Departures

The four recent proposals related to the taxation of intangible income arise from longstanding congressional policy concerns. In this sense they represent incremental rather than fundamental change.

n92 The proposals, however, include at least two significant features that have no close analogs in existing law. Option C and the Enzi proposal hinge tax treatment of intangible income on whether the income is derived from serving U.S. or foreign markets. The excess returns proposal and the Schwartz patent box provide formulas for determining whether, and the extent to which, income is subject to immediate rather than deferred U.S. taxation (in the case of the excess returns proposal) or reduced U.S. taxation (in the case of the Schwartz patent box). These destination-based and formula-based features challenge two central tenets of the accepted structure of cross-border income taxation: (1) source-based taxation of business income based largely on the physical presence of labor and tangible capital that contribute to the production of income and (2) arm's-length transfer pricing principles that respect formal legal arrangements such as risk-shifting among commonly controlled entities. In proposing destination-and formula-based rules, the Obama administration, Chairman Camp, Representative Schwartz, and Senator Enzi have contributed to a growing global challenge to the decades-old structure of international taxation.

In one significant departure from the structure of most current U.S. international tax rules, Option C and the Enzi proposal provide a dual-rate, destination-based method of taxing intangible income, with intangible income derived from serving foreign markets taxed at a lower rate than intangible income from serving the U.S. market. Option C's destination-based rule would tax a U.S. parent company at a 15% rate on foreign intangible income and at the general 25% corporate tax rate on intangible income derived from serving the U.S. market. n93 These destination-based tax rates would apply to both income of the CFC and the U.S. parent company. The Enzi proposal's somewhat similar destination-based rules would tax a U.S. parent company at half the normal U.S. corporate tax rate on foreign intangible income that it derived in the conduct of a U.S. trade or business; the proposal would maintain full U.S. taxation of a U.S. parent corporation's domestic intangible income. n94

[*535] In another departure from the structure of most existing U.S. international tax rules, the formula-based rules of the excess returns proposal and the Schwartz patent box provide unfavorable (in the case of the excess returns proposal) or favorable (in the case of the Schwartz patent box) tax treatment of targeted income only to the extent the income satisfies formulas that measure cost-based returns. The excess returns proposal would tax currently under subpart F U.S.-connected intangible income to the extent the income in question was in excess of 150% of the costs properly attributable to the income. n95 The Schwartz patent box would apply its reduced 10% tax rate to patent-related income only to the extent the income exceeded a "routine profit" equal to a mark-up of 15% over certain costs properly allocable to the income. n96

Neither the destination-based rules of Option C and the Enzi proposal nor the formula-based rules of the excess returns proposal and the Schwartz patent box have close analogs under current law. The foreign base company sales and services income rules of current law, which might be the most significant parallels to the destination-based rules of Option C and the Enzi proposal, are destination-based in the sense that they create current U.S. taxation under subpart F only of a CFC's income from sales for use and services performed outside the CFC's country of organization. n97 But the current foreign base company rules are much narrower than the destination-based rules of Option C and the Enzi proposal because the former apply only in the context of related party transactions and only when taxpayers fail certain exclusions (such as the manufacturing exception from foreign base company sales income and the objective cost test under the substantial assistance prong of the foreign base company services income rules), whereas the dual-rate, destination-based structures of Option C and the Enzi proposal provide destination-based tax rates for much of a U.S.

MNC's intangible income (both CFC and U.S. parent company income in the case of Option C; U.S. parent company income in [*536] the case of the Enzi proposal), in respect of both related and unrelated party transactions.

The nearest current law precedent for the formula-based features of the excess returns proposal and the Schwartz patent box might be the transfer pricing regulations' residual profit-split method of evaluating whether the allocation of related parties' combined profits attributable to particular transactions is arm's length. n98 This residual profit-split method allocates profits among related taxpayers by first giving each taxpayer a market rate of return on its routine contributions to the relevant business activity and then dividing the residual profit, if any, based on each taxpayer's nonroutine contributions, particularly of intangible property. n99 This two-step allocation of routine returns and residual profits parallels the excess returns proposal's and Schwartz patent box's identification of threshold levels of returns on costs below which the proposals do not apply. Unlike the excess returns proposal and the Schwartz patent box, however, the residual profit-split method does not prescribe a particular profit margin that is considered routine. n100 That determination is instead made on a case-by-case basis by reference to market returns in unrelated-party transactions.

The destination-based and formula-based features of the recent legislative proposals challenge the primacy of arm's-length transfer pricing and source-of-income rules in the structure of cross-border income taxation. Multinational businesses and tax administrators allocate income among legal entities in the MNC group under arm's-length [*537] transfer pricing rules that generally respect legal arrangements such as risk-shifting among commonly controlled entities. n101 In a parallel process, multinational businesses and tax administrators ascertain the place of origin, or source, of items of income that arm's-length transfer pricing allocates to one or another entity in an

MNC group. They do so under source-of-income rules that generally rely on the decades-old notion that income arises in the location of the labor and tangible capital that produce the income. n102

Arm's-length transfer pricing and source determinations have substantive tax consequences for MNCs. When an MNC that is a resident of one country derives income from operations in another country, under broadly accepted principles of international taxation, one country (the country of residence of the MNC) or the other (the country in which the income has its source) might assert primary right to tax the income based on either the taxpayer's residence or the source of the income. Much cross-border investment income is taxed on a residence basis (that is, by the country of residence of the taxpayer deriving the investment income), and much cross-border business income is taxed on a source basis (that is, by the country in which the business income originates). n103 For example, under bilateral income tax treaties, the business profits of a resident of one treaty country attributable to that resident's permanent establishment in the other treaty country (the source country) may be taxed by the source country, and the residence country is required to relieve double taxation by exempting the profits from tax or allowing a credit for source country tax. n104

In various ways, the destination-based rules of Option C and the Enzi proposal and the formula-based rules of the excess returns proposal and the Schwartz patent box disrupt this transfer-pricing-based and source-based taxation of cross-border intangible income. Transfer pricing matters to the taxation of a U.S. MNC's intangible income under current law because a transfer pricing allocation of the intangible [*538] income to a CFC often means that the income is subject to U.S. taxation, if at all, only when the income is repatriated to the U.S. parent company. As one example of why sourcing of intangible income matters under current law, recall that treating a U.S. parent company's royalty income as foreign source helps the company with its FTC planning. n105 Option C is the most direct of the four proposals in reducing the significance of transfer pricing and source determinations. It diminishes the importance of transfer pricing because the rate of U.S. tax imposed on a U.S. MNC's intangible income varies not based on the transfer pricing allocation of the income to one entity or another in the group, but instead based on whether the income - whether allocated to the U.S. parent company or to a CFC - is from serving the U.S. or a foreign market. Option C similarly diminishes the importance of source-based taxation because source - at least when understood in the traditional sense of the location of physical factors of income production - has no role in determining the tax rate on a U.S. MNC's intangible income; the question, instead, is whether the income is from sales or services to the United States or abroad.

The destination-based feature of the Enzi proposal similarly makes transfer pricing and source determinations less central to the taxation of U.S. MNCs' intangible income than those determinations are now. For a U.S. MNC with intangible income, a central question under the Enzi proposal is whether the income is from serving the U.S. market or a foreign market because income from serving the U.S. market would benefit from a 50% tax rate reduction. n106 As a result, a transfer pricing allocation of intangible income to the U.S. parent rather than to a CFC would penalize a U.S. MNC less than it does under the current law full taxation (less FTC) of intangible income of U.S. parent companies. n107 And source would become less central because the U.S. or foreign source of a U.S. parent company's intangible income - again, under a traditional understanding of source - would not matter at all to the availability of the 50% rate cut.

The formula-based feature of the excess returns proposal would broaden current law subpart F's contravention of the consequences of arm's-length transfer pricing. Under current law, transfer pricing allocations of income to CFCs are largely irrelevant if subpart F causes current U.S. taxation of the income. Subpart F, however, has limited [*539] application to business income under current law because the foreign base company sales and services income rules, the rules under which business income might be considered subpart F income, apply only to income from certain related-party, cross-border sales and services transactions, and through planning U.S. MNCs often can avoid having foreign base company sales or services income. The excess returns proposal may expand subpart F's contravening of the results of arm's-length transfer pricing allocations to a much broader category of income: Any high-return intangible income of a CFC would be caught if it was attributable to U.S.-connected intangible property and was subject to a low rate of foreign tax.

The Schwartz patent box does not so directly contravene arm's-length transfer pricing, but it shares the excess return's proposal's suspicion of the arm's-length standard. The Schwartz patent box would allow its reduced tax rate only to patent-related profits in excess of a 15% mark-up over certain allocable costs. As an alternative to this formula-based approach, the bill would allow a taxpayer to elect to calculate its patent-related profits by reference to arm's-length transfer pricing principles - but only in accordance with guidance provided by the Treasury Secretary. n108 Representative Schwartz could have chosen to, but did not, make this arm's-length calculation the default rule for determining patent-related profits. Her contrary choice of a formula-based approach as the default suggests an uncertainty about the consequences of applying arm's-length transfer pricing in calculating the amount of income attributable to intangible property.

By challenging traditional source-of-income and transfer pricing principles with their destination-based proposals and formula-based proposals, the Obama administration, Chairman Camp, Senator Enzi, and Representative Schwartz have joined a growing global questioning of whether policymakers can rely on decades-old principles to produce a coherent allocation of MNCs' cross-border income in an era in which businesses generate substantial returns from investments in intangible property. The allocation of the jurisdiction to tax cross-border income on the basis of the residence of the income earner and the origin or source of the income dates to a report prepared by four economists for the League of Nations ninety years ago. n109 In their report the economists struggle mightily with the question of how to assign income streams to one country or another when activities related to the income occur in more than one place. They use the example [*540] of a tea plantation in Java to illustrate the ambiguity of the concept of source: What is the source of income, the example asks, when the growing of the tea, the management of the enterprise, the transportation of the tea, and the sales to customers take place in multiple countries? n110 Notwithstanding the economists' uncertainty about source, in the succeeding decades governments have used source as the basis for taxing much cross-border business income. And as the Java example might have suggested, source rules for business income often rely on the presence of physical factors in the production of income. The growing global challenge to this longstanding international framework questions the importance of physical factors of production when intangible property is so prominent and is not clearly located in a particular place.

Policymakers and tax administrators in Australia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have expressed doubts about old concepts in various contexts including high-profile public hearings in which executives of large companies have testified. n111 For example, in a recent speech Australia's Assistant Treasurer David Bradbury said:

When economic activity was dominated by farms, factories and mines, it was usually straightforward to objectively determine the source of income by observing where the physical economic activity occurred; that is, where the factors of production were physically located. In contrast, the rise of intangibles and the digital age pose significant challenges to the question of source of income for tax purposes: not just in how to apply it, but even whether it is the right concept to be [*541] using in allocating taxing rights in relation to intangible factors of production. n112

The OECD has undertaken two major projects that question fundamental features of the international tax regime. As part of a project on the transfer pricing rules related to intangible property, the OECD published a draft document that significantly revises the OECD's transfer pricing Guidelines related to intangibles. n113 Among other things, the document repudiates the view that contractual arrangements that shift intangible-related risks and return among legal entities in an MNC group should almost always be respected. n114 The revised draft Guidelines instead state that contractual arrangements that allocate intangible returns to one entity in an MNC group must follow the substance of the arrangement:

For a member of an MNE [multinational enterprise] group to be entitled to intangible related returns, it should in substance:

. Perform and control important functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangibles and control other related functions performed by independent enterprises or associated enterprises that are compensated on an arm's length basis;

. Bear and control the risks and costs related to developing and enhancing the intangible; and

. Bear and control risks and costs associated with maintaining and protecting its entitlement to intangible related returns. n115

The OECD also is studying the intertwined phenomena of corporate tax base erosion and shifting of profits to low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions. As part of this study, the OECD published a preliminary survey of those topics. n116 That survey includes a statement that succinctly encapsulates the questioning of the traditional source of income and transfer pricing principles:

[*542]

In an era where non-resident taxpayers can derive substantial profits from transactions with customers located in another country, questions are being raised as to whether the current rules ensure a fair allocation of taxing rights on business profits, especially where the profits from such transactions go untaxed anywhere. n117

Predictions about the consequences of these global challenges to the existing structure of international taxation are hazardous. One question is whether changes to the structure, assuming there are any, will be incremental or will represent a paradigm shift. Another question is the extent to which any changes will be unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral.

Observers to current discussions might imagine ranges of outcomes from the least to the most thoroughgoing change and from the least to the most universally agreed. For example, a thoroughgoing paradigm shift could see countries around the globe agreeing to a treaty mechanism for swiftly revising source, transfer pricing, and permanent establishment concepts in a manner that takes into account the importance of intangible property. In the absence of multilateral agreement on new concepts, countries might promote a paradigm shift over time by amending existing bilateral income tax treaties. In an incremental, unilateral outcome, individual countries might adopt CFC rules or make changes to their existing rules - for example, in the manner of Chairman Camp's, Senator Enzi's, or the Obama administration's proposed amendments to subpart F - to provide increased residence country taxation in situations in which cross-border income otherwise would be subject to little or no tax in any country. n118 Unilateral changes could serve as models for other countries and thereby might promote a messy multilateralism. n119

[*543] Any changes to the international tax rules, whether incremental or paradigm shifting, whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, will benefit from new thinking about the role of intangibles in the global economy and about first principles of cross-border taxation that take into account the prominence of intangibles. Where does cross-border income originate when it is attributable to ideas and brand names as much as to factories and assembly line workers? Even assuming there is a satisfactory answer to this question, should the origin principle remain central in allocating jurisdiction to tax cross-border income, or should some other principle take its place? Individuals across the globe know that in our everyday lives such intangible-heavy products as Lipitor, Tide detergent, Coca-Cola, Google's search software, and Microsoft Windows have been ubiquitous. Much harder than recognizing these products for their ubiquity is the task of devising a coherent cross-border taxing scheme for the modern economy.

Legal Topics:

For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:

Patent LawOwnershipPatents as PropertyTax LawInternational TaxesGeneral OverviewTax LawState & Local TaxesIncome TaxGeneral Overview

FOOTNOTES:

n1. This example is adapted from two sources: Glenn R. Simpson, Wearing of the Green: Irish Subsidiary Lets Microsoft Slash Taxes in U.S. and Europe, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 2005, at A1; Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 19-23 (2012) available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittee/investigations/hearings/offshore-profit-shift (exhibit no.1a, Memorandum to Members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations).

n2. The Code treats a corporation organized in Puerto Rico or another U.S. territory, such as the U.S. Virgin Islands, as a foreign corporation. IRC § 7701(a)(4), (5), (9) (defining a domestic corporation as a corporation organized in the United States or under U.S. law or the law of any state; defining a foreign corporation as any corporation that is not domestic; and defining the United States as including only the U.S. states and the District of Columbia).

n3. E.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699, 701-25 (2011); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 Tax L. Rev. 99, 99-101 (2011); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Drug Company Profits Shift Out of the United States, 126 Tax Notes 1163, 1163-67 (Mar. 8, 2010); Jesse Drucker, Forest Laboratories' Globe-Trotting Profits, Bloomberg Businessweek, May 13, 2010, available at http://www. businessweek.com/magazine/content/10 21/b4179062992003.htm (last visited June 11, 2013); Jesse Drucker, The Tax Haven That's Saving Google Billions, Bloomberg Businessweek, Oct. 21, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10 44/b4201043146825.htm (last visited June 11, 2013); Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2012, at A1; Simpson, note 1.

n4. E.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for Reconciliation, 2 World Tax J. 3, 3-18 (2010); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 497, 507-15 (2009); Michael C. Durst, A Suggested Addition to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 134 Tax Notes 1315, 1315-19 (Mar. 5, 2012); Michael A. Durst, A Two-Option Compromise for Intangibles Pricing Guidelines, 135 Tax Notes 1277, 1277-79 (June 4, 2012).

n5. For examples of these competing views, see transcript of Hearing Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Transfer Pricing Issues, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Hon. Sander Levin, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways and Means).

n6. This description of returns from intangible property is informed by the author's discussions with Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff, the Joint Committee on Taxation.

n7. IRC§§367(d), 482 (defining intangible property income by reference to § 936(h)(3)(B), the definition of intangible property in the intangible property income rules of the now-expired tax credit for economic activity in Puerto Rico and the other U.S. possessions). The last phrase of this definition ("which has substantial value independent of the services of any individual") highlights the concept of intangible income: The value of an employee's services is represented by the wages paid to that employee, and returns generated by employees that are in excess of the employees' wages are intangible property returns to the extent they are not attributable to investment in tangible capital such as an income-producing machine. Returns generated by labor in excess of wages, for instance, might be attributable to the unique way in which a company organizes the assembly line production of the goods that it sells. This unique organizational method is intangible property.

The rule for the source of income from the sale of intangible property defines intangible property in an overlapping manner as "any patent, copyright, secret process or formula, goodwill, trademark, trade brand, franchise or other like property." IRC § 865(d)(2).

n8. Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten & Daniel Sichel, Measuring Capital and Technology: An Expanded Framework, in Measuring Capital in the New Economy 11, 30 (Carol Corrado, John Haltwanger & Daniel Sichel eds., 2005).

n9. Id. at 34.

n10. Id. at 30-35.

n11. Consistent with international standards, the BEA plans to begin treating research and development spending as capital investment as part of a revision of the national income and product accounts in 2013. See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Concepts and Methods of the U.S.

National Income and Product Accounts (Chapters 1-9) 2-3, 6-4 n.5 (2011), available at http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/nipachapters1-9.pdf. The current version of the System of National Accounts, which is an internationally-agreed-upon framework for the compilation and reporting of national economic statistics, recommends treating research and development as part of capital formation, a change from the treatment of research and development in the previous version, System of National Accounts 1993. See European Comm'n, Int'l Monetary Fund, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., United Nations & World Bank, System of National Accounts 2008, 583, 585-86 (2009), available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/SNA2008.pdf. For a comparison of the BEA's national income and product accounts with the System of National Accounts, see Charles Ian Mead, Karin E. Moses & Brent R. Moulton, The NIPAs and the System of National Accounts, Surv. Current Bus., Dec. 2004, at 17, 17-19.

n12. See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, note 11, at 1-4. For the BEA's research related to this satellite account and innovation more broadly, see Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Innovation Account, http://www.bea.gov/national/newinnovation.htm (last visited June 14, 2013).

n13. Jennifer Lee & Andrew G. Schmidt, Research and Development Satellite Account Updates, Estimates for 1959-2007, Surv. Current Bus., Dec. 2010, at 16.

n14. Id. at 17.

n15. Id. at 17-18.

n16. Id. at 18.

n17. An MNC's value added is the portion of its output attributable to its own production. In dollar terms this value added is the sum of costs incurred in (excluding intermediate inputs), and profits from, production. Id. at 26.

n18. Id.

n19. Id.

n20. Jeffrey H. Lowe, Direct Investment for 2009-2011: Detailed Historical-Cost Positions and Related Financial and Income Flows, Surv. Current Bus., Sept. 2012, at 28, 34. In the same year U.S. affiliates of foreign MNCs paid $ 19.3 billion in royalties and license fees to their foreign parent corporations and received $ 4 billion in royalties and license fees, for total net payments of $ 15.3 billion. Id. at 69.

n21. Id. at 34. The data refer to this aggregate total return as "direct investment income," composed of (1) the parents' shares of the net income from their foreign affiliates' operations, and (2) net interest income received by parents from loans to and trade accounts with the foreign affiliates. Id. at 32.

n22. Royalties and license fees were less significant relative to total returns for foreign MNCs and their U.S. affiliates. Foreign MNCs earned $ 151.5 billion from their equity and debt investments in their U.S. affiliates. Accordingly, for every $ 10 of income foreign MNCs earned on their equity and debt investments in their U.S. affiliates, they earned $ 1 of net receipts of royalties and license fees. Id. at 69.

n23. For a brief history and description of the U.K.'s schedular system, see John Tiley, The United Kingdom, in Comparative Income Taxation 145-48, 153-54 (Hugh J. Ault & Brian J. Arnold eds., 3rd ed. 2010).

n24. IRC § 61(a).

n25. Outside the context of cross-border intangible income, prominent examples of particular kinds of income to which special rules apply include domestic manufacturing income (taxed at a reduced rate under § 199), capital gains of individuals (taxed at reduced rates under § 1(h)(1)), and qualified dividend income of individuals (taxed under § 1(h)(11) by reference to the tax rates in effect for individuals' capital gains).

n26. E.g., Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Present Law and Background Related to Possible Income Shifting and Transfer Pricing 18-36 (Comm. Print 2010); Joel D. Kuntz & Robert J. Peroni, U.S. International Taxation P A3.07 (2012); Samuel M. Maruca, Transfer Pricing: The Code, the Regulations, and Selected Case Law, Foreign Income Portfolios (BNA Tax Management) 886-2d (2012).

n27. This Article does not describe in detail the subpart F rules for foreign base company sales income (§ 954(d)) and foreign base company services income (§ 954(e)). In broad terms, those rules apply to a CFC's income from cross-border sales and services in transactions involving related parties. Foreign base company sales and services income can be attributable to intangible property when income from services or the sale of tangible property includes a return related to intangible property used in producing the good or service. This sort of income is often referred to as "embedded intangible income." For example, a pharmaceutical company's income from the sale of a patented medicine includes embedded intangible income to the extent the sales income relates to the patents. For a description of the foreign base company sales and services income rules, see Joint Committee, note 26, at 36-46.

n28. IRC § 862(a)(4). Conversely, the royalty income is U.S. source if the property for which the royalty is paid is used in the United States. IRC § 861(a)(4).

n29. See IRC § 865(d). This rule is an exception from the general source rule for income from the sale of personal property, which provides that this sales income is U.S. source when derived by a U.S. resident and foreign source when derived by a nonresident. See IRC § 865(a).

n30. See IRC § 904.

n31. Foreign-source royalties received by U.S. MNCs are often subject to little or no foreign tax because bilateral income tax treaties eliminate or significantly reduce withholding tax on royalty payments and because those payments are typically deductible in the country from which the payments are made.

n32. The FTC limitation rules of § 904 facilitate this cross-crediting because they treat many royalty payments - both a U.S. parent company's royalties that would qualify for the active royalties exception from subpart F (described below) if received by a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) and royalties received by a U.S. parent company from a CFC out of the CFC's non-subpart F income - as general category rather than passive category income for purposes of the requirement that the FTC limitation be applied separately to separate categories of income. See IRC § 904(d)(2)(B), (3)(C). A consequence of treating royalties as general category income is that excess FTCs from high-tax, general category income from operating a foreign business can be used to offset residual U.S. tax on the royalties.

n33. Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income, in Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices, and Implications 319, 327 (John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008).

n34. The source (or allocation and apportionment) rules for research and experimental expenses, found in regulations, not the Code, also can help a company make full use of its FTCs. All else equal, a U.S. company prefers to apportion expenses to its U.S.-source gross income rather than its foreign-source gross income because an apportionment to foreign-source gross income would reduce foreign-source taxable income and thereby decrease the company's FTC limitation. The basic apportionment rule for research and experimental expenditures permits a taxpayer to apportion half of its deduction for those expenditures to U.S.-source income if it performs research and experimentation activities that account for more than half of the amount of the deduction in the United States. Reg. § 1.861-17(b)(1)(i). The other half of the deduction is apportioned based on the location of sales of products related to the research and experimentation. Reg. § 1.861-17(c)(1). Taxpayers may elect an optional gross income method. Reg. § 1.861-17(d). Consequently, a company that carries out most of its research in the United States may treat half of its research expenditures as reducing U.S.-source, rather than foreign-source, gross income even if it could be shown that as a factual matter some of the U.S.-apportioned expenses generated foreign-source income by, for example, leading to the creation of patented products that were mostly sold abroad.

n35. The subpart F rules are in§§951-964.

n36. See H.R. Rep. No. 87-1447, at 58 (1962), which noted:

The testimony before your committee did convince it that many [U.S. MNCs] have taken advantage of the multiplicity of foreign tax systems to avoid taxation by the United States on what could ordinarily be expected to be U.S. source income... . Your committee has also concluded that U.S. tax should be imposed currently, on the American shareholders, on income which is held abroad and not used in the taxpayer's trade or business ...

n37. IRC § 954(c)(1)(A).

n38. IRC § 954(c)(2)(A). The exception also applies to rents. A narrower exception applies to rents and royalties received from related parties. Under this exception, a royalty (or rental) payment is not foreign personal holding company income if it is received by a CFC from a related corporation for the use of property within the country in which the CFC is organized. IRC § 954(c)(3)(A)(ii).

n39. IRC § 954(c)(6).

n40. This observation is not intended to suggest that U.S. MNCs do not have the need for sophisticated tax planning in relation to intangible property or more generally. That planning, however, often is in relation to other issues. For example, much cross-border tax planning of U.S. MNCs is intended to minimize foreign taxes without causing a corresponding increase in U.S. taxation - as one possibility, by reason of the foreign base company rules of subpart F.

U.S. MNCs commonly enter into contract manufacturing arrangements that avoid generating foreign base company sales income only if the arrangements satisfy the detailed contract manufacturing rules promulgated in 2009. See T.D. 9438, 2009-1 C.B. 387. These contract manufacturing arrangements may achieve tax savings, for instance, by assigning high returns from ownership of tangible and intangible property, manufacturing oversight, assumption of various business and legal risks, and other activities to an entity referred to as a "principal" that is organized in a low-tax jurisdiction such as Switzerland and by assigning low returns from physical manufacturing to contract manufacturers in one or more higher-tax jurisdictions such as Germany. These arrangements may achieve nontax objectives such as the efficient allocation of an MNC's global resources. For a description of the contract manufacturing regulations and the use of contract manufacturing for tax and nontax reasons, see Joint Committee, note 26, at 15, 37-45.

U.S. MNCs also must take care that their foreign tax planning does not create subpart F income by reason of the foreign base company services income rules. Foreign base company services income arises from services performed by a CFC outside its country of organization for or on behalf of a related person. Services performed on behalf of a related person include situations in which a related person has provided "substantial assistance" to the CFC's performance of services. Reg. § 1.954-4(b)(1)(iv). U.S. MNCs commonly enter into transactions in which CFCs receive substantial assistance. Under guidance issued in 2007, assistance is considered substantial assistance only if it is provided by a related U.S., not foreign, person and only if the costs of the assistance are at least 80% of the total costs of the CFC in performing the services. Notice 2007-13, 2007-1 C.B. 410.

n41. This method of allocating income to members of a commonly-controlled multinational group of corporations is known as formulary apportionment. For an argument that the United States should adopt a formulary apportionment system for taxing the income of MNCs, see Avi-Yonah et al., note 4, at 507-15.

n42. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1). The transfer pricing regulations have undergone great transformation over the last four decades. The first set of regulations providing methods for implementing the arm's-length standard took effect in 1968. For a history of transfer pricing regulations and judicial decisions since then, and an argument that more recently promulgated transfer pricing methods such as the profit-split method have departed from the traditional conception of the arm's-length standard, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 Va. Tax Rev. 89 (1995).

n43. H.R. Rep. No. 87-1447, at 61 (1962); see H.R. 10650, 87th Cong. § 13(a) (1962). This rule was broader than the provision that was enacted because it taxed a 10% U.S. shareholder of a CFC on its share of not only royalty payments received by the CFC, but also income of the CFC from the sale of goods when the CFC used a U.S.-developed patent, copyright, or exclusive formula or process in manufacturing the goods, that is, embedded intangible income.

n44. H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 423 (1985).

n45. Id. at 423-25.

n46. Id.

n47. See note 43.

n48. Revenue Act of 1962, H.R. 10650, 87th Cong. (1962), reprinted in 4 Staff of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, Legislative History of H.R. 10650, 87th Congress, The Revenue Act of 1962, Public Law 87-834, at 3747-4158 (1967).

n49. S. Rep. No. 87-1881, at 83 (1962).

n50. Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 103(b), 120 Stat. 345, 346-47.

n51. H. Rep. No. 109-304, at 45 (2005).

n52. For a review and criticism of the original neutrality concepts, and a description of a more recent ownership neutrality framework, see James R. Hines Jr., Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income, 62 Tax L. Rev. 269 (2009). See also Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 Nat'l Tax J. 937, 955-57 (2004) (among other things, describing the capital ownership neutrality benchmark). For an argument that debates based on these neutrality theories fail to distinguish between two margins on which U.S. international tax rules affect U.S. taxpayers' investment decisions (the overall tax burden on foreign investment and the rate at which the U.S. tax system reimburses foreign taxes), see Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Foreign Tax Creditability, 63 Nat'l Tax J. 709, 720 (2010).

n53. See Shaviro, note 52, at 718-19.

n54. See id.

n55. Id. at 718.

n56. See note 3.

n57. For example, in introducing a hearing at which chief financial officers of four U.S. multinational corporations testified, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp stated:

The U.S. is one of the last major economies to operate a worldwide system for active business income, which many believe is a further barrier to the growth of American companies. Capital will find its way to the most profitable opportunities around the world. But when U.S. companies must pay an additional U.S. tax on top of the tax they pay in the foreign market, then that capital is more likely to be invested through foreign companies who do not face this additional tax.

The Need for Comprehensive Tax Reform to Help American Companies Compete in the Global Market and Create Jobs for American Workers, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Rep. Dave Camp).

n58. Treasury Dep't, General Explanation of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2014 Revenue Proposals 49-50 (2013), available at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/documents/general-explanations-FY2014.pdf [hereinafter Excess Returns Proposal]. Similar proposals were included in the fiscal year 2011, 2012, and 2013 budgets. Treasury Dep't, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2011 Revenue Proposals 43-44 (2010); Treasury Dep't, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2012 Revenue Proposals 43-44 (2011); Treasury Dep't, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals 88-90 (2012).

n59. H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong., A Bill to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Provide for Comprehensive Income Tax Reform 53 (Discussion Draft 2011), at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/discussion draft.pdf (last visited June 16, 2013) [hereinafter Camp Discussion Draft].

n60. United States Job Creation and International Tax Reform Act of 2012, S. 2091, 112th Cong.§§103, 201 (2012) [hereinafter Enzi Proposal].

n61. Manufacturing Innovation in America Act of 2012, H.R. 6544, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter Schwartz Patent Box Proposal]. Representative Schwartz reintroduced her bill in the 113th Congress. Manufacturing Innovation in America Act of 2013, H.R. 2605, 113th Cong. (2013). Senator Dianne Feinstein also has publicly announced plans to introduce a bill that would institute a so-called "patent box" regime under which the United States would tax corporate income from the sale of patented products that are manufactured in the United States at a preferential 15% rate rather than at the normal 35% corporate tax rate. Dianne Feinstein, Putting America Back to Work, http://www.feinstein. senate.gov/public/index.cfm/putting-america-back-to-work (last visited June 17, 2013); see also Dianne Feinstein, Leveling the Playing Field Act of 2012, at http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File id=c7efe846-c626-40a5-b9b3-1a8b2c5e589a (last visited June 17, 2013) [hereinafter Feinstein Proposal]. Shortly before this Article went to print, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus released staff discussion drafts of legislation that would overhaul the U.S. international tax rules. For the discussion drafts and related materials, see http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id= f946a9f3-d296-42ad-bae4-bcf451b34b14 (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). Although these discussion drafts represent major tax reform, they do not include comprehensive changes to rules specifically addressing intangible income.

n62. Excess Returns Proposal, note 58, at 49-50. If the effective foreign tax rate imposed on the income was 10% or less, all the income would be taxed currently in the United States. Id. The proposal would phase out current U.S. taxation ratably at rates from 10% to 15%. Id.

The proposal itself does not state the percentage markup to be used in determining the amount of a taxpayer's income that is subject to the proposal, but legislative language that the Administration released in fall 2011 as part of a broad economic plan provides that income attributable to the use or exploitation of intangible property would be excess income only to the extent the income exceeded 150% of the costs attributable to the income. See The President's Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction: Legislative Language and Analysis, reprinted in 2011 TNT 188-34 (Sept. 28, 2011), available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.

n63. Excess Returns Proposal, note 58, at 49-50.

n64. Id.

n65. See text accompanying notes 82-91.

n66. See Camp Discussion Draft, note 59, § 331C. The draft creates a new category of foreign base company income, "foreign base company intangible income." See id. This income would be a CFC's income from either the sale, lease, license, or other disposition of property in which intangible property was used directly or indirectly or the provision of services related to intangible property or in connection with property in which intangible property was used directly or indirectly - but in either case, only to the extent that the income properly was attributable to the intangible property. Id. Intangible property would be defined by reference to the broad definition under § 936(h)(3)(B) (described previously). Accordingly, foreign base company intangible income would include not only, as one example, royalties, but also the portion of income from sales or services that was attributable to intangible property (embedded intangible income). For instance, embedded intangible income would include the portion of income from the sale of a prescription drug that was attributable to the drug's patents.

n67. Id. More specifically, the Discussion Draft defines foreign intangible income as intangible income derived in connection with (1) property that was sold for use, consumption, or disposition outside the United States or (2) services provided with respect to persons or property located outside the United States. Thus, for example, the intangible income attributable to prescription drug sales to foreign consumers would be foreign intangible income. The amount of the rate reduction in the Discussion Draft is in brackets, meaning that the amount is left open for discussion. The bracketed amount is a 40% deduction from income taxed at the generally prevailing 25% corporate tax rate that the Discussion Draft provides (in § 201), with the result that foreign intangible income derived by a CFC would be taxed at 15%.

n68. Id. § 201.

n69. Enzi Proposal, note 60, § 201.

n70. Id.

n71. Id. Intangible income has the same meaning as it does in the Camp Discussion Draft. Id. § 103.

n72. H. Comm. on Ways & Means, Highlights of Ways and Means Discussion Draft: Participation Exemption (Territorial) System, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/territorial one pager.pdf (last visited June 18, 2013). The Camp Discussion Draft provides two alternative "anti-abuse" rules, the excess returns proposal (referred to in the draft as Option A) and, like the Enzi bill, a low-tax test for current U.S. taxation under subpart F (Option B). According to a three-page summary of the bill, Options A, B, and C "address concerns expressed by commentators that under a participation exemption system, U.S. companies would have an increased incentive to shift income to foreign jurisdictions, especially through the migration of intangible property overseas." H. Comm. on Ways & Means, Summary of Ways and Means Discussion Draft: Participation Exemption (Territorial) System 2, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/summary of ways and means draft option.pdf (last visited June 18, 2013) [hereinafter Discussion Draft Summary].

n73. H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 423 (1985).

n74. H.R. Rep. No. 87-1447, at 61 (1962).

n75. Camp Discussion Draft, note 59, § 331C.

n76. Id.

n77. Enzi Proposal, note 60, § 103. The rate reduction would be provided by a deduction for 50% of a corporation's qualified foreign intangible income. Certain income, including payments under cost-sharing arrangements and amounts treated as received by the U.S. corporation under the § 367(d) commensurate-with-income requirement, would not be eligible for the rate reduction. Id.

n78. Discussion Draft Summary, note 72, at 2.

n79. Both bills allow a domestic corporation a deduction for 95% of a dividend received from a CFC out of the CFC's foreign-source income. Enzi Proposal, note 60, § 101; Camp Discussion Draft, note 59, § 301. The Discussion Draft brackets the 95% amount to indicate flexibility about the exemption level in future legislative developments.

n80. H. Comm. on Ways & Means, Reforming the Tax Code to Get America Working Again, at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/international 2 page final.pdf (last visited June 18, 2013).

n81. 158 Cong. Rec. S497-98 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2012) (statement of Sen. Michael Enzi), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-02-09/pdf/CREC-2012-02-09.pdf [hereinafter Enzi Floor Statement].

n82. Discussion Draft Summary, note 72, at 2. Over the last decade, several European countries have enacted preferential tax regimes for patent and other intellectual property income. It is thought that the regimes have been referred to as "patent boxes" because the income qualifying for reduced taxation is in a separate box for reporting purposes. For a description of European patent box systems, see Peter R. Merrill, James R. Shanahan Jr., Jose Elias Tome Gomez, Guillaume Glon, Paul Grocott, Auke Lamers, Diarmuid MacDougall, Alina Macovei, Reme Montredon, Thierry Vanwelkenhuysen, Alexandra Cernat, Stephan Merriman, Rachel Moore, Gregg Muresan, Pieter Van Den Berghe & Andrea Linczer, Is It Time for the United States to Consider the Patent Box?, 134 Tax Notes 1665 (Mar. 26, 2012). The Discussion Draft Summary refers to an "innovation" rather than "patent" box as a way of signaling that Option C's reduced tax rate for foreign intangible income would apply broadly to all intangible income, not just to patent-related income. See Discussion Draft Summary, note 72, at 2.

n83. Enzi Floor Statement, note 81, at S497.

n84. In broad terms, high returns are defined as profits in excess of a "routine profit," which is defined as a 15% mark-up on certain allocable costs. Schwartz Patent Box Proposal, note 61, § 2.

n85. Id.

n86. Press Release, Allyson Y. Schwartz, The Manufacturing American Innovation Act: A New Way of Thinking in Corporate Tax Policy, at http://schwartz.house.gov/press-release/manufacturing-american-innovation-act-new-way-thi nking-corporate-tax-policy-0 (last visited June 25, 2013). In touting her intended patent box bill (described in note 61), Senator Feinstein has similarly argued that a patent box would "increase returns to investments in research and development." Feinstein Proposal, note 61.

n87. See, e.g., Feinstein Proposal, note 61 ("Manufacturing jobs across the country - both blue-and white-collar - continue to be offshored, and the effects are dire. Not only does the U.S. employment base continue to suffer, but companies are experiencing a significant decline in innovation, a byproduct of a strong manufacturing industry... . The United States cannot sit on the sidelines while our economic competitors aggressively market themselves through lucrative incentive programs. Doing nothing is a tacit acknowledgment that America is content becoming a second-rate innovator and manufacturer.").

n88. H.R. Rep. No. 97-201, at 111 (1981). The regulations for the allocation and apportionment of research and experimentation expenditures (described previously in note 34), which took effect in 1995, also can be understood as part of a recurrent tax policy goal of encouraging U.S. research. These regulations are not explicitly an incentive but may operate as one: If a taxpayer engages in a sufficiently high proportion of its research activities in the United States, it can automatically treat half of its research expenses as reducing U.S.-source, not foreign-source, income, thereby leaving its FTC limitation unaffected by that half of the expenses even though those expenses arguably generate foreign income - for example, royalties that a foreign affiliate pays for a license to use intangible property such as a patent in its foreign business.

Notwithstanding that the 50% U.S. apportionment rule may operate as an incentive, Treasury promulgated the rule in 1995 for the stated reason that the apportionment to foreign income that would result from application of the 50% rule (and two other rules in the 1995 regulations) would be within the range of allocations and apportionments to foreign income generated by at Treasury economic study carried out in conjunction with the development of the new rules. See 60 Fed. Reg. 27453, 27454, Allocation and Apportionment of Research and Experimental Expenditures (May 14, 1995). The earlier regulations, which dated to 1977, permitted a 30% exclusive apportionment of research expense to U.S.-source income. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(3)(ii). The Treasury study concluded that although the 30% exclusive apportionment rule overall could be seen as accurately reflecting the factual relationship between domestic research expenditures and foreign income, in some cases this rule could be unfair to taxpayers. Treasury Dep't, The Relationship Between U.S. Research and Development and Foreign Income (1995), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), May 19, 1995. The study therefore recommended decreasing the apportionment to foreign income by about 25%, id., and the 1995 regulations carried out this reduction by adopting the 50% exclusive apportionment rule and several related rules. Reg. § 1.861-8(b)(1)(ii); see T.D. 8646, 60 Fed. Reg. 66502 (Dec. 22, 1995).

n89. IRC § 41.

n90. IRC § 41(a). The excess-over-base-period rules are intended to restrict the research credit to taxpayers that increase their research expenditures over time. In lieu of the 20% credit for expenditures over a base period amount, a taxpayer may elect the so-called "alternative simplified credit." The amount of that credit is 14% of the taxpayer's qualified research expenses in excess of 50% of the taxpayer's average qualified research expenses for the three preceding years. IRC § 41(c)(5).

n91. H.R. Rep. No. 97-201, at 111 (1981).

n92. As noted previously, the international tax bills in which Option C and the Enzi proposal are included provide thoroughgoing reform.

n93. See note 67 (defining foreign intangible income).

n94. Unlike Option C, the Enzi proposal does not create parity between the taxation of intangible income derived by CFCs and the taxation of intangible income derived by U.S. parent corporations. The Enzi proposal would tax currently at the full U.S. corporate tax rate intangible income that was derived by CFCs and was subject to a low foreign tax rate, whether the income was from serving the U.S. or a foreign market. Enzi Proposal, note 60, § 201.

n95. Excess Returns Proposal, note 58, at 49-50.

n96. Schwartz Patent Box Proposal, note 61, § 2.

n97. The exception from foreign personal holding income under subpart F for income derived in the active conduct of a banking, financing, or similar business (the so-called "active finance exception") also has destination-based features such as the restriction that no income of any corporation other than a licensed bank, broker, or dealer qualifies for the exception unless more than 30% of the corporation's income is derived directly from an active lending or finance business from transactions with unrelated customers located within the corporation's home country. See IRC § 954(h)(3)(B).

n98. See Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(3).

n99. Id.

n100. By contrast with the residual profit-split method of the transfer pricing regulations, the expired Puerto Rico and possession tax credit's optional profit-split method for allocating income to a possession corporation did prescribe a percentage allocation. See IRC § 936(h)(5)(c)(ii). Unlike the possession tax credit's default income-allocation rules, the optional profit-split method (and the other optional method, the cost-sharing method) permitted taxpayers to claim the tax credit in respect of intangible income. A taxpayer that satisfied certain significant presence and manufacturing or production requirements in respect of a possession business could elect to use this profit-split method to allocate to its possession corporation 50% of its affiliated group taxable income (including intangible income) from the sale of a product or the provision of a service related to the possession business, thereby making this allocated income eligible for the credit against U.S. tax. See IRC § 936(h)(5)(c)(ii).

This optional profit-split method therefore shared the formula-based nature of the excess returns proposal and the Schwartz patent box, but the latter two proposals are potentially much more broadly applicable than the profit-split method of the possession tax credit. The excess returns proposal would create potential U.S. tax for any U.S. MNC that derived intangible income through a CFC, and the Schwartz patent box would offer a low rate of tax to any taxpayer that has patent-related nonroutine profits. The optional profit-split method was available only to a subset of U.S. MNCs that had business operations in a U.S. territory.

n101. For a description of a structure (the "double Irish Dutch sandwich"), now famous among tax practitioners, that relies on the allocation of risk among affiliated legal entities, and a discussion of related transfer pricing strategies, see Kleinbard, Stateless Income, note 3, at 706-13, 733-37.

n102. Examples of these U.S. source rules include the rules that income from the performance of personal services has a source in the location of performance, that rents have a source in the location of the property giving rise to the rents, and that royalties have a source in the place in which the person paying the royalty is given the privilege of using the patent, copyright, or other property for which the royalty is paid. See IRC§§861(a)(3), (4), 862(a)(3), (4).

n103. For a description of this dichotomy, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301, 1306-11 (1996).

n104. See U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, arts. 7, 23, Nov. 15, 2006, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) PP 209.07, 209.23 (Business Profits and Relief from Double Taxation).

n105. See notes 30-34 and the accompanying text.

n106. See Enzi Proposal, note 60,§§103, 201.

n107. In fact, under the Enzi destination-based feature, an allocation to the U.S. parent rather than to the CFC benefits a U.S. MNC if the intangible income in the hands of the CFC would have been subject to full, current U.S. taxation under the new subpart F category for low-taxed income.

n108. Schwartz Patent Box Proposal, note 61, § 2(a) (proposing IRC § 200(b)(2), (3), (9)).

n109. Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73 F.19 (1923).

n110. Id. at 23-24. For a more recent description of the ambiguity of the concept of source, see Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in Taxation in the Global Economy 30-31 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990) ("The idea that income has a locatable source seems to be taken for granted, but the source of income is not a well-defined economic idea.").

n111. These doubts have sometimes taken concrete form in the expression of the sentiment that U.S. MNCs that own highly valuable intangible property and that serve European markets should be paying more tax to the governments of the countries whose markets they serve. See Eric Pfanner, European Countries Seek More Taxes from U.S. Multinational Companies, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2012, at B1. On the other hand, over the past several years successive governments in the United Kingdom have implemented thorough international corporate tax reform explicitly intended to be business-friendly. See HM Treasury, Corporate Tax Reform: Delivering a More Competitive System 8-16 (Nov. 2010), at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/corporate tax reform complete document.pdf (last visited June 26, 2013) (describing the government's program of, among other things, corporate tax rate reduction, exemption of foreign business income of U.K. firms, and enactment of a patent box regime to tax patent-related income at preferential rates).

n112. Hon. David Bradbury, MP, Address to the Tax Institute of Australia's 28th National Convention (Mar.15, 2013), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/2013/003.htm&pageID=005&min=djba&Year=&DocType.

n113. OECD, Discussion Draft, Revision of the Special Considerations for Intangibles in Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Related Provisions (2012), available at www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/50526258.pdf.

n114. See id.

n115. Id. at 17.

n116. OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 33-47 (2013).

n117. Id. at 36.

n118. Recent public statements suggest that, consistent with its now four-year-old excess returns proposal, the Obama administration favors this incremental approach in which governments increase residence country taxation in some circumstances by reforming their CFC rules. See Lee A. Sheppard, Offshored Intangibles and the OECD Base Erosion Project, 139 Tax Notes 367 (Apr. 22, 2013) (describing a conference presentation by Treasury Dep't Int'l Tax Counsel Danielle Rolfes).

n119. Messy multilateralism might describe the process fostered by the U.S. enactment of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act ("FATCA"), Pub. L. No. 111-147,§§501-541, 124 Stat. 97-117 (2010). FATCA, which imposes 30% U.S. withholding tax on certain payments of investment income to foreign financial institutions if those institutions do not comply with requirements to report information about their account holders to the IRS, received much criticism for, among other things, its unilateral approach to combating cross-border tax evasion by U.S. citizens. E.g., Scott D. Michel & H. David Rosenbloom, FATCA and Foreign Bank Accounts: Has the U.S. Overreached?, 62 Tax Notes Int'l 709 (May 30, 2011) More recently, however, European officials in particular have argued in favor of cross-border, multilateral information exchange with agreements under FATCA as a template for that exchange, and the OECD is undertaking efforts at a single model for automatic exchange of information. See Joe Kirwin, Five EU-Member Nations Adopt Pilot Project Modeled After FATCA, 69 Bloomberg BNA Daily Tax Rep. I-1 (2013); OECD, A Step Change in Tax Transparency: OECD Report for the G8 Summit (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/taxtransparency G8report.pdf . One scholar has described the evolution from unilateral legislation to an emerging global framework. Itai Grinberg, Emerging Countries and the Taxation of Offshore Accounts (Georgetown Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 13-031, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2256587.